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INTERNATIONAL LAW: IMPLICATIONS OF THE
OPENING OF THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE
Recent discovery and development of oil deposits on Alaska's
northern coast and the subsequent search for the most economic
method of transporting the oil to market have caused American oil
companies to investigate shipping possibilities in the Northwest
Passage.' Since the trip of the tanker-icebreaker S.S. Manhattan,
which proved the feasibility of the Northern route to the oil fields,
some Canadian officials have shown concern over continuing Ca-
nadian sovereignty in the area.2 Canada's gradually increasing
activities in the northern provinces and the waters around them,
which include mineral exploration, resource development, and sci-
entific data accumulation,3 have led concerned Canadian legis-
lators to propose that all the waters within the North American
1. On September 15, 1969, the New York Times reported that the S.S.
Manhattan became the first commercial vessel ever to traverse the ice
blocked Northwest Passage. The test run was made to determine the abil-
ity of a 115,000 ton, 1,005 foot long tanker-icebreaker to make the voyage.
The object of what Humble Oil officials called a $40 million gamble was to
assess the feasibility of this route, which is one-half the length of the trip
through the Panama Canal. See N.Y. Times, id., Sept. 15, 1969, § 1, at 1,
col. 5; id., Aug. 25, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 3; id., Aug. 31, 1969, § 1, at 23, col. 1.
2. Mr. Paul St. Pierre, a liberal representative from British Colum-
bia, when discussing the three Canadian ships which spilled many gallons
of fuel oil when crushed by the ice of the Passage, described the situation
as "a shocking example of the need for Canadian control of shipping of the
Arctic Archipelago." He also has stated that there is no real doubt that
the waters are traditionally Canadian. N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, § 1, at
23, col. 1.
More recently Canadian officials have issued stronger statements about
Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic and uneasiness about United States
intentions in the waters of the Arctic has increased. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22,
1970, § 1, at 7, col. 1.
From Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Secretary of State for External Af-
fairs: "It would be difficult to argue that the Arctic waters between
Canadian territory have been regarded as part of the high seas .... We
have regarded the Arctic waters as our waters." Id.
Prime Minister Trudeau has indicated that, if the Manhattan makes
another voyage this spring, guarantees against the dangers of oil spillage
will be required. Id. He earlier illustrated perfectly the motivation behind
this comment when he said that while Canada certainly owns the islands
in the North American Archipelago, he is not sure of the status of the water
between. N.Y. Times. Aug. 31, 1969, § 1, at 23, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times,
Nov. 26, 1969, § 1, at 14, col. 1.
3. See PHARAND, Innocent Passage in the Arctic, in 6 CANADIAN




Archipelago be declared the internal waters of Canada.4 Because
the islands of the Archipelago are Canadian property and Canada
has historically been the guardian of the waters between the
islands, this proposal does not seem extraordinary. However, under
international law foreign vessels do not have the right of in-
nocent passage through the internal waters of a foreign state.
Therefore, a Canadian declaration that the waters of the Northwest
Passage are internal could close that channel to commercial oil
shipments and cause entities with Alaskan oil interests to challenge
such a declaration in order to preserve their right of passage.
In order that Canada make valid a claim that the Northwest
Passage is internal water, a system of straight baselines, as this
concept is defined below, must be imposed surrounding the entire
Archipelago according to the principles of international law.
Straight baselines are an exception to the general rules of law
which provide that baselines should follow the coastline.6 This
Comment will deal with the right of Canada to impose such a
straight baseline system and with the related question concerning
the existence of the right of innocent passage in the Northwest
Waterway. To analyze these problems the Canadian situation will
be discussed in light of the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case of
19517 and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone." The possibility that the Northwest Passage
might be an international strait will also be explored.
BASELINE CONCEPT
Key to all zonation of water and seabed off the coast of a
state is the baseline. It forms the inner limit of the terri-
torial sea. . . . The same baseline forms the maximum
margin of a State's internal waters, such as bays, inlets,
estuaries and other bodies of water associated with the
shoreline.10
4. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1970, § 1, at 7, col. 1.
5. See Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116; U.N. Doc.
A/CoNF. 13/L. 52 (this is the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone). See generally G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MAuAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as SCHWARZEN-
BERGER]; 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF' INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965) [hereinafter
cited as 4 WHITEMAN].
6. U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 13/L. 52, art. 3. See also writers cited at 4
WHITEMAN 137ff (1965).
7. (1951] I.C.J. 116.
8. U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 13/L. 52.
9. Corfu Channel (Merits) Case, [1949] I.C.J. 1.
10. PEARcY, Geographical Aspects of the Law of the Sea, in 49 ANNALS
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN GEOGRAPHERS 1, 5 (1959) (cited at 4
WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at 139 (1965)).
The location of the baseline determines the amount of control the
coastal state may exercise over the water around it. From the
baseline landward all waters, bays, lakes, rivers, and areas of
ocean are considered the internal waters of the state in question.11
The state exercises jurisdiction over these waters just as if they
were land within the state's boundaries. 12 It may restrict any
activity, pass any manner of regulation, and prohibit ships of any
flag from trespassing. The right to innocent passage does not
have to be given. 13
The sea from the baseline outward for a designated number of
miles, usually three,' 4 is called the territorial sea. Over this
area the control of the coastal state is somewhat limited. It may
regulate such activities as fisheries, use of the seabed, coastal
trade, and pilotage. However, it must extend to foreign merchant
vessels enjoyment of the right to innocent passage.'6 Any passage
is innocent when conducted in a manner not harmful to the safety
of the coastal state.
16
All water outside the outer limit of the territorial sea is
classified as high seas and is governed by the well established prin-
ciple requiring freedom of the seas.17 This catch phrase, "freedom
of the seas," actually denotes a group of rules which have become
international law because of long international custom and ac-
quiesence in the rules. The right to unlimited navigation and
fishing on the high seas have been, more recently, joined by the
freedom to overfly and the freedom to lay submarine cables.,
However, this unlimited usage is slightly tempered by the existence
of a contiguous zone. This is a belt of water outside the territorial
sea which must be policed by a state for its own protection;' 9
therefore the coastal state may exercise control over customs and
pollution.
2 0
The above explanation indicates that, if the waters of the
11. U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 13/L. 52.
12. Under normal circumstances internal waters are within the state
boundaries and there is no question as to complete sovereignty.
13. The United States has passed legislation prescribing tonnage re-
quirements of ships, establishing duties at United States ports, controlling
carriage and discharge of petroleum, regulating carriage of explosives on
United States navigable waters. See 46 U.S.C. 77ff (1964).
14. This varies widely and may range up to 200 miles as claims by
some nations. See 4 WHmzmA, supra note 5, at 21ff, for a chart-like
listing of territorial widths.
15. U.N. Doc. A/CoNiq. 13/L. 52, § III, art. 14ff; SCHWARZENBERSEE
supra note 5, at 127.
16. See Corfu Channel (Merits) Case, [1949] I.C.J. 1; U.N. Doc.
A/CoNF. 13/L. 52, art. 14, 4.
17. SCHWARZFNBRGER, supra note 5, at 133; 4 WirmwAN, supra note 5,
at 499.
18. See Geneva Convention on the High Seas, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF.
13/L. 53, art. 2.




Northwest Passage are internal, no right to innocent passage will
exist therein. On the other hand, if the waters are merely part
of Canada's territorial sea, innocent passage must be granted.
There are two types of baselines, normal baselines and straight
baselines. The legal status of the waters is determined by the
type of baselines which are applied. The normal baseline is lo-
cated by tracing the low waterline along a state's seacoast.21 This
low water line would be the baseline and from it would be meas-
ured the width of the territorial sea as described above. A normal
baseline is, therefore, drawn on the land mass of the coastal state
and no sea area is circumscribed by it. Thus none of the sea
area becomes internal waters. Historically, however, there has
been an exception to this general rule and straight baselines have
been used in very short measures to close the mouths of bays or
rivers or natural indentations of a coastline in order to make
the territorial sea more uniform and to provide a boundary for
the state's internal waters.22 A straight baseline consists of a
line drawn over water which connects parts of a state's land mass
and may surround parts of the sea in so doing.
28
The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case of 195124 changed radi-
cally the status of the straight line exception to the normal base-
line rule. That case provides a basis for a Canadian claim that
straight baselines connect the North American Archipelago and
make the waters of the Northwest Passage internal waters of
Canada.
THE FisHiERS CAsE
One method of determining the proper baseline would be to
submit the question to the International Court of Justice. The
basis for an International Court ruling on such a dispute is the
Fisheries Case. That case involved a dispute between the United
Kingdom and Norway concerning the location and extent of the
Norwegian national fisheries. In order to protect and enlarge the
waters comprising her fisheries zone, Norway had instituted a
system of forty-seven straight baselines surrounding her coast-
line.25  These lines connected rocks or islands, sometimes sub-
21. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case of 1951, [1951] I.C.J. 116; U.N.
Doc. A/Coqr. 13/L. 52.
22. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116, 129.
23. The essential difference between normal and straight baselines
lies in the fact that the former are located on land, while straight baselines
are water based connecting stray outcroppings of land mass.
24. [1951] LC.J. 116.
25. Id.
merged, which were part of the skjaergaard (rock rampart) that
surrounds 500-600 miles of the Norwegian coast.26 By application
of these lines Norway had extended her baseline up to fifteen miles
from her coastline and had thus extended her territorial sea, in
which a state has exclusive fishing rights, many miles farther from
the coast.27 The United Kingdom brought the dispute before the
International Court to test the validity of these forty-seven lines,
eight of which were more than twenty miles long and two of
which were forty miles in length.28  Claiming that this use of
straight baselines was inconsistent with the historic use of base-
lines to close natural indentations in coastlines, 29 the United King-
dom asked that the traditional methods of baseline determination
be used and that the area claimed by Norway as her fisheries zone
be declared high seas.30
The court accepted jurisdiction of the controversy stating:
The delimitation of sea areas has always an international
aspect, it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the
coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although
it is true that the act of delimitation is necessary a uni-
lateral act, because only the coastal State is competent to
undertake it, the validity of the determination of the de-
limitation with respect to other States depends upon inter-
national law.31
The United Kingdom specifically submitted that the baseline must
either be the "normal" configuration, the low water mark on
permanently dry land (note that this is not the true definition of
a normal baseline) or the line that encloses internal waters such
as the bays and fjords of Norway.32 Alternatively, it was pleaded
that if the baseline was to be drawn over water, then it must be
within four miles of the mainland.83 The court felt that the only
question for decision was the validity of the straight baselines
which Norway had applied. Holding in favor of the Norwegian
claim, the court gave three reasons for allowing straight baselines:
(1) that the low rather than the high water mark is applicable;
(2) that the baseline endpoints need not be on permanently dry
rocks; and (3) that straight baselines under stated circumstances
do not violate international law.3 4 With respect to this final rea-
son, the court said:
This [straight baselines] has been done, not only in the
case of well-defined bays, but also in cases of minor curva-
26. Id. at 140.
27. Id. at 132.
28. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, vol. I, at 86-7
(1951).
29. Discussed at notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
30. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951) I.C.J. 116, 120.
31. Id. at 132.
32. Id. at 120.
33. The Norwegians claimed a territorial sea of a four mile width.
34. [1951] I.C.J. 116, 128 (emphasis added).
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tures of the coastline where it was solely a question of
giving a simpler form to the belt of territorial waters.
3 5
Having thus decided that straight baselines were not invalid per se,
the court had only to determine whether their usage was valid in
the particular circumstances of the Fisheries Case. In order to
make this determination, the court formulated three criteria to help
determine whether the straight baselines proposed are valid under
international law. First, the baselines must not depart appreciably
from the general direction of the coast. Second, the sea areas lying
within the baseline must be so closely linked with the land that
they are considered internal waters. Third, there should be pe-
culiar economic interests evidenced by long usage.86 Applying
each of these tests to the Norwegian baselines, the court found
that the general direction of the coast is "devoid of any mathe-
matical precision" 37 and that in reality the skjaergaard is what
constitutes Norway's coastline.3 8 The first criterion was therefore
met. As to whether the sea areas and land domain were closely
linked, the court found that there was a "more or less close rela-
tionship existing between certain sea areas and the land forma-
tions which surround them."3 9 With respect to the economic test,
the court spoke in terms of a land mass that was relatively
barren, the inhabitants of which gained their livelihood essentially
from fishing. It cited both the long Norwegian usage of the en-
closed waters and the extended United Kingdom acquiesence in
such usage.40 For these reasons the International Court held that
the Norwegian baselines were not violative of international law.
Notable was the absence from the court's criteria of any con-
sideration of the length of the baselines or their distance from
the mainland. Thus the decision appears to support the idea that
lengthly straight baselines far from the mainland may be drawn
under stated circumstances. It follows that if Canada can meet
the criteria established by the International Court, straight base-
lines may be drawn surrounding the North American Archipelago.
1958 CoNvENTIoN
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Con-
tiguous Zone 4' provides a more general reference point for baseline
35. Id. at 129.
36. Id. at 133.
37. Id. at 128-42.
38. Id. at 128.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 142.
41. U.N. Doc. A/CoNP. 13/L. 52.
questions than does the Fisheries Case. The rules of law taken from
the Fisheries decision must be limited because they arose from a
specific fact situation. While analogies may be drawn, application
of the rules from the Fisheries Case depends, in the final analysis,
on the accuracy of the analogy. On the other hand, the 1958 Con-
vention is not limited by these considerations. It contains several
sections important to the determination of baselines:
Article 3-Except where otherwise provided in these arti-
cles, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the
territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast....
Article 4-
1. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and
cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast
in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines
joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured.
2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast,
and the areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently
linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of
internal waters.
4. Where the method of straight baselines is applica-
ble under the provisions of paragraph 1, account may be
taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic in-
terests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and
importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage.
Article 5-
1. Waters on the landward side of the baseline of the terri-
torial sea form part of the internal waters of the State.
2. Where the establishment of a straight baseline in ac-
cordance with article 4 has the effect of enclosing as inter-
nal waters areas which had previously been considered
part of the territorial sea or of the high seas, a right of
innocent passage ... shall exist in those waters. 4 2
These sections show that the Convention has incorporated
much of the customary international law on the subject of base-
lines. Article 3 states the general rule, then article 4 sets out in
fairly specific terms the straight baseline exception and the tests for
application of the exception. The Convention does, however, differ
from traditional international law in one important way. The pro-
vision in paragraph 2 of article 5, which requires the preservation
of innocent passage in newly enclosed internal waters, is at odds
with the customary international law as found in the Fisheries
Case. It was there held that no right to innocent passage existed
in the newly enclosed Norwegian internal waters.43 If Canada is
bound by this provision of the Convention, regardless of the status
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. See, [1951] I.C.J. 116ff.
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of the waters of the Northwest Passage, Canada will be forced
to grant the right of innocent passage.
However, while Canada is a signatory of the 1958 Convention,
she has not yet ratified it.44 The question therefore arises: to
what extent is a non-ratifier bound by the provisions of this Con-
vention? It is apparent that Canada may not be contractually
bound by the entire Convention because she has not ratified it.
45
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases40 provide the answer to the
binding effect of the Convention. In that case Denmark, the
Netherlands, and Germany became involved in a dispute over own-
ership of the North Sea Continental Shelf and the three countries
submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court. Denmark
and the Netherlands had ratified the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf,47 but Germany had not ratified it. The ques-
tion before the court was whether Germany could be bound by a
Convention to which it was not a party. Two aspects of the ques-
tion were discussed. First, the court recognized that a type of
estoppel might be applied in situations like this, but that a state
may be bound only by reason of past comments, declarations, state-
ments and pronouncements which clearly and consistently showed
acceptance of the Convention. Additionally, there must have been
detrimental reliance on these actions by the states claiming the
estoppel.48 Secondly, the court recognized that there are "general
or customary law rules and obligations which, by their very nature,
must have equal force for all members of the international com-
munity. ' '49 To the extent that these rules are reflected in a con-
vention even non-ratifiers are bound by them. Following the
reasoning of the Continental Shelf Cases, Canada will be bound
only by those portions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone which reflect customary baseline rules un-
less there is an estoppel.
At this point, the important question is whether article 5,
paragraph 2 of the Convention reflects customary law. In the
Fisheries Case it was specifically stated that the right of access to
internal waters for the purpose of passage is not a part of custo-
44. Convention on the territorial sea and contiguous zone, adopted
April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, TIAS No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
45. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 8 INTE NATIONAL LEGAL MA-
TEIALS 340, 360 (1969).
46. Id.
47. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 53.
48, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 8 INTENATIONAL LEGAL MA-
TERIALS 340, 360 (1969).
49. Id. at 371.
mary international law.5 0 Although there is some possible basis
for estopping Canada to deny that she is bound by the Conven-
tion,5 1 the language of the International Court in the Continental
Shelf Cases should be emphasized. "It is not lightly to be presumed
that a State which has not carried out these formalities, [ratifica-
tion] though at all times fully able and entitled to do so, has
nevertheless somehow become bound in another way."
52
It appears from this discussion that Canada will be bound
only by the customary rules of international law which are found
in the Convention. Canada will not be bound by that part of
article 5 which makes a new rule unless she ratifies the Convention.
THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE AS AN INTERNATIONAL STRAIT
One other consideration, with respect to the problem at hand,
does not deal with the question of the suitability of straight base-
lines, but rather with the existence of the right of innocent passage
through straits. The Corfu Channel (Merits) Case13 dealt with
the right of a British warship to pass through an international
strait located within the territorial waters of Albania. The In-
ternational Court stated:
It is in the opinion of the Court generally recognized and
in accordance with international custom that States in time
of peace have a right to send their warships through straits
used for international navigation between two parts of the
high seas without the previous authorization of the coastal
State provided that the passage is innocent.5 4
If, under the circumstances of the Corfu Channel Case, the Inter-
national Court is willing to allow a warship innocent passage,
that same court certainly would extend the same right to merchant
vessels in international straits. The voyage of the S.S. Manhattan
through the Northwest Passage included the navigation of two
straits. At the eastern end of the Passage was Barrow Straits and
at the western end was Prince of Wales Strait. If these straits meet
the tests set out in the Corfu Channel Case, innocent passage must
be preserved in them. If it is assumed that normal baselines are
applied by Canada, then both of these straits lie between two parts
of the high seas. Are they, however, "used for international navi-
gation?" The only activity of an international nature in the North-
50. [1951] I.C.J. 116, 125.
51. See Reference Re Ownership of Off-Shore Mineral Rights, 65
D.L.R.2d 353 (1968), where the Canadian Supreme Court said: "The logical
starting point is now the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone which may be regarded as defining the present state
of international law on the subject." See also the 1963 statement by the
Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs which said that the con-
vention "formulates and develops rules which are applicable in interna-
tional law generally." See generally PHARAND, supra note 3, at 51ff.
52. 8 INTERNATiONAL LEGAL IMERIALs 340, 360 (1969).
53. [1949] I.C.J. 1.
54. Id. at 28.
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west Passage was the single trip of the Manhattan. All other
navigations have been strictly local Canadian scientific and de-
velopmental efforts." However, the court's ruling in the Corifu
Channel Case has been interpreted to mean that the decisive cri-
terion is not the volume of traffic, but the geographical location of
the strait5" between two parts of the high seas. Although some
weight must be given to the phrase "used for international naviga-
tion" in the court's opinion, it is clear that location is of primary
importance. Regardless of the fact that geography is important,
it is submitted that, where a strait has been used only once in all
of history for such navigation, it cannot be called an international
strait. Assuming, however, that these two straits do come under
the Corfu Channel rule using normal baselines, the situation merits
further investigation assuming straight baselines are imposed.
It seems clear that under a straight baseline system the right
of innocent passage through these straits need not be granted.
In that case the two straits would no longer connect parts of the
high seas, but would, in fact, connect one area of high sea with
one area of Canadian internal water. While international law pro-
vides for the right of innocent passage through straits linking two
parts of the high seas, it does not provide for such a right in the
case of straits linking open sea with an internal body of water.5 7
Thus application of the Corfu Channel Case also depends upon
which type of baselines are used.
APPLICATION OF THE FOREGOING PRINCIPLES TO CANADIAN WATERS
If the Canadian desires for the North American Archipelago
are viewed in light of the three areas discussed above, several
resolutions are available. If normal baselines are required, the
Northwest Passage will be delimited territorial sea of Canada or
high seas and the right to innocent passage will exist throughout.
Additionally, such innocent passage will be preserved in those
areas of the Northwest Passage which are straits because of the rul-
ing in the Corfu Channel Case. On the other hand, Canada might
be allowed to impose straight baselines, either under the Fisheries
Case or the 1958 Convention. In either case, the right to inno-
cent passage in the newly enclosed waters would be extinguished
unless Canada is estopped to deny the applicability of the entire
55. PHARAND, supra note 3, at 42ff.
56. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKcE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
OcEANs 204-08 (1962); J. SYATAUW, DEcIsIONs OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JusTIcE 26 (1962).
57. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [19512 I.C.J. 116, 125.
1958 Convention.5 8
Under the Fisheries Case, the court established three tests
used to determine the applicability of straight baselines. The first
test was whether the direction of the proposed baseline differs
greatly from the direction of the coast. A look at a map shows that
a baseline connecting the outer edges of the islands in the North
American Archipelago would indeed vary to a great extent from
the actual coastline of the Canadian mainland. However, several
arguments may be offered to offset this deficiency. The most im-
portant argument is based on the emphasis that the International
Court placed on its holding in the Fisheries Case that the skjaer-
gaard or archipelagic configuration was the coastline of Norway 9
Logically, this statement would apply, with equal force, to the
North American Archipelago. In fact, the language of the court
that such archipelagoes should be considered as "a whole with
the mainland," shows how liberally this test should be applied.60
Straight baselines as applied in the Canadian situation would follow
the direction of the archipelagic unit and meet the requirements of
the courts liberal application. Another consideration follows from
the court's acknowledgement that there can be no mathematical
precision in this area; 61 it must be recognized that any straight
baseline, by definition, must depart from the direction of the
coast. Therefore it appears that the first requirement can be
fulfilled.
The second test offered by the International Court was whether
the sea areas enclosed were sufficiently linked to the land to be
called internal. Although the court was rather vague about the
application of this test, some learned writers feel that it is a refer-
ence to the possible coastal need for control over access.8 2 Indeed,
this interpretation logically follows from the main distinguishing
feature of internal waters, the non-existence of the right to inno-
cent passage, i.e. control over access. It is exactly this needed con-
trol which prompts Canada's concern. This control over access is
a necessity if Canada is to prevent pollution and exploitation of her
northern provinces. It seems, therefore, that the second criteria
is also met.
The third test proposed by the court was the economic interest
test evidenced by long usage. Since the S.S. Manhattan was the
first commercial ship ever to make the crossing, there is no evidence
of long economic usage. Evidently, Canada must fail under the
Fisheries Case rules because her economic interests in the north-
ern provinces are as yet undeveloped.
58. Discussed at notes 41-52 and accompanying text supra; selective
provisions quoted at text accompanying note 42 supra.
59. [1951] I.C.J. 116, 128.
60. Id.
61. Id.




In mitigation, however, a brief discussion of some realities
may be enlightening. While the fishing industry in Norway is
certainly long established, the northern provinces of Canada are
largely virgin territory. There has been no economic usage of the
area because its potentialities have only recently been discovered.
There simply has been no time to establish long usage and ac-
quiesence by other states. This is an example of emerging rather
than historical economic interests. These mitigating arguments
notwithstanding, it seems as if Canadian straight baselines must
fail under the Fisheries Case.
Under the 1958 Convention, however, the opposite result will
be reached. As noted above,"3 the Convention seems to apply
similar criterion as did the Fisheries Case, but the language used
there seems to apply directly to the Canadian situation. Paragraph
1 of article 4 covers the coastal archipelago expressly when it
speaks of "a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vi-
cinity .... ,,"4 When this language is read with paragraph 2 and
the language quoted from the Fisheries Case8 5 indicating that the
skjaergaard, the fringe of islands, is the coastline, it appears ar-
guable that the fringe of islands make up the coastline and ob-
viate the necessity for a strict following of the coastline. In fact,
the "use of a straight baseline for a coastal archipelago, which had
direct sanction in the Court's judgment, [in the Fisheries Case] was
accepted as coming within the 'special case' of the straight base-
line system .. "66
More important is the fact that the Convention relegates the
economic test to a secondary role. Paragraph 4 of article 4 states
that account "may be taken" of economics.67 Additional evidence
for the secondary role of purely economic considerations is drawn
from the report of the International Law Commission:
The International Law Commission in its treatment of the
baseline concept . . . allowed straight baselines to be ap-
plied to a coastal archipelago or 'a fringe of islands along
the coast in its immediate vicinity,' even though the 'eco-
nomic interests' factor was given a secondary role in decid-
ing the baseline system. 8
63. See the provisions of the Convention quoted at text accompanying
note 42 supra.
64. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 52, art. 4.
65. I.e., that the skjaergaard is in reality the coast of Norway.
66. T. KOBAYASHI, THE ANGLO-NoRwEGAN FISHERE CASE OF 1951,
AND THE CHANGING LAW OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA 69 (1965).
67. U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 13/L. 52, art. 4.
68. T. KOBAYASI, THE ANGLO-NORWEGIAN FIsHERIEs OF 1951, AND
THE CHANGING LAW OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA 55 (1965).
It is apparent that the Geneva Convention has attached more im-
portance to the geographic configuration of the coastal state in
question than to evidence of long economic usage. Therefore,
since Canada qualifies on the other factors, as seen above,6 9 straight
baselines may be drawn around the North American Archipelago
and the waters of the Northwest Pasage may be called the internal
waters of Canada. It follows from the discussion of the applica-
bility of the Convention that Canada would be able to suspend in-
nocent passage in these waters. If straight baselines are applied,
the Corfu Channel Case is inapplicable and innocent passage will
also be suspended in the straits which are part of the Northwest
Passage.
WALTER G. REINHARD*
69. See discussion at text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
* The author wishes to acknowledge the help of James D. Harmon,
Jr. who contemporaneously wrote a paper on the same subject for the Inter-
national Law Seminar at Dickinson School of Law and who, although he
reached the opposite conclusion, provided much guidance.
